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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Tashina Marie Alley (hereinafter, Tashina) appeals from her judgment of 
conviction for conspiracy to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to deliver a 
controlled substance and conspiracy to deliver or possess with intent to deliver drug 
paraphernalia. She asserts that the district court erred by denying her motion to dismiss 
and by instructing the jury that a mistake of law is not a defense to a conspiracy charge. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On September 8, 2011, Detective Joseph Andreoli began a drug investigation at 
a warehouse near Costco in Boise. (Tr., p.509, Ls.2-23.) He eventually connected the 
warehouse to Morgan Alley (hereinafter, Morgan) and the Red Eye Hut and began 
surveillance on Morgan's residence and the store. Detective Andreoli testified that he 
saw Tashina, Morgan's wife, enter the warehouse for several minutes on September 12, 
2011 and exit the warehouse on September 13. (Tr., p.528, Ls.1-6, p.598, Ls.6-7.) 
Detective Andreoli first connected the Red Eye Hut to the warehouse on 
September 22, 2011 and entered the store on September 26. (Tr, p.529, L.13 - p.530, 
L. 7.) He believed the store was a "head shop" selling drug paraphernalia. (Tr., p.531, 
Ls.1-24.) On September 22, he saw Tashina drive from her residence to the store, 
where she "approached the door and spoke with somebody inside the Red Eye Hut." 
(Tr., p.551, Ls.18-23.) She did not enter that day. (Tr., p.551, Ls.24-25.) On 
September 26, Morgan and Tashina drove to the Red Eye Hut; Morgan exited the 
vehicle and Tashina drove away. (Tr., p.552, Ls.12-21.) 
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After several controlled buys at the Red Eye Hut that contained the chemicals 
JWH-019 and AM-2201, search warrants were executed on the warehouse, Morgan 
and Tashina's residence, and the Red Eye Hut. Tashina spoke with Detective Andreoli 
during the search of the residence. According to the detective, Tashina stated that she 
was "well aware of" what was happening at the warehouse and the Red Eye Hut and 
that she had been to both locations. (Tr., p.832, Ls.1-4.) Detective Andreoli testified 
that Tashina stated that, "what we are doing is completely legal" because other people 
in Boise were doing the same thing. (Tr., p.832, Ls.8-14.) She stated that they were 
selling "Twizted Potpourri." (Tr., p.834, Ls.8-9.)1 
Morgan admitted that he had been using the warehouse to make Twizted 
Potpourri. He believed that the substance AM-2201 had not been made illegal by Idaho 
law and he applied this chemical to plant material at the warehouse, which would 
eventually be sold at the Red Eye Hut. (Tr., p.1424, L.17- p.1425, L.10.) Morgan had 
a lab report that stated that AM-2201 was legal in Idaho. (Tr., p.1426, Ls.12-14.) He 
testified that the he applied AM-2201 to plant material to make the potpourri; he did not 
testify to using any other chemical. (Tr., p.1463, Ls.19-25.) Morgan also testified that 
Tashina was not at all involved in the business of making potpourri and that his 
involvement in the business nearly cost him his marriage. (Tr., p.1513, Ls.4-10, p.1518, 
Ls.23-25.) 
Tashina was charged with conspiracy to manufacture, deliver, or possess with 
intent to deliver a controlled substance, conspiracy to deliver or possess with intent to 
1 Detective Andreoli also believed that Tashina took a document that he believed to be 
diluting instructions with regard to synthetic cannabinoids from the residence and 
flushed it down the toilet at the jail. (Tr., p.838, Ls.10-23.) This allegation was the basis 
for a destruction of evidence charge on which the jury was unable to reach a verdict. 
(R., p.437.) 
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deliver drug paraphernalia, and destruction, alteration or concealment of evidence. 
(R., p.30.) Her case was consolidated with Charlynda Lynn Goggin, Cadee Jo 
Peterson, Matthew Taylor, and Morgan, among others. (R., p.37.) 
Morgan filed a motion to dismiss, which was subsequently joined by Tashina. 
(R., p.69.) Morgan asserted that Idaho had not criminalized AM-2201 and that 
I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30(ii), which defined synthetic cannabinoids, was unconstitutionally 
vague. (3/12/12/ Tr., p22., L.16 - p.27, L.6.) The district court denied the motion, 
holding that AM-2201 was illegal at the time and that the statute was constitutional. 
(R., p.185.) Morgan thereafter pleaded guilty but preserved the right to appeal from the 
denial of the motion to dismiss. (See State v. Alley, docket number 40428.) Morgan's 
case is currently before the Court of Appeals. 
Tashina went to trial and was found guilty of the conspiracy charges but the jury 
was unable to reach a verdict on the destruction of evidence charge. (R., pp.435-37.) 
The district court imposed unified sentences of five years, with two years fixed, and the 
court suspended the sentences and placed Tashina on probation. (R., p.451.) Tashina 
appealed. (R., p.445.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err by denying Ms. Alley's motion to dismiss? 
2. Did the district court err by instructing the jury that a mistake of law was not a 




The District Court Erred By Denying The Motion To Dismiss 
A. Introduction 
Prior to trial, Morgan filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that AM-2201 had not 
been criminalized in Idaho at the relevant time in this case. The district court denied the 
motion, holding that AM-2201 had been criminalized and that I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30(ii) 
was not was unconstitutionally vague. (R., p.185.) While Morgan subsequently entered 
a conditional guilty plea preserving the right to appeal from this ruling, Tashina went to 
trial. She now asserts that the district court erred in denying the motion Morgan filed 
and that she eventually joined. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In interpreting statutory language, a reviewing court gives the words their plan, 
usual ordinary meaning; where language is not ambiguous, the court should not resort 
to legislative history or any other sources. See Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 
151 Idaho 889, 893 (2011 ). The interpretation of a statute presents questions of law 
over which appellate courts exercise free review. State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 
798 (2004). Where the constitutionality of a statute is likewise a question of law over 
which this Court exercises free review. Doe Iv. Doe, 138 Idaho 893, 903 (2003). 
C. The District Court Erred By Denying The Motion To Dismiss 
As the district court noted in the order denying the motion to dismiss, the motion 
was initially filed by Morgan and then later joined by several codefendants, including 
Tashina. (R., p.208.) The court noted that Tashina and the other defendants did not file 
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briefs or examine witnesses in this matter, and thus the court based its conclusion 
solely on the arguments and evidence presented by Morgan. (R., p.208.) Further, 
Tashina recognizes that the decision by the Court of Appeals will control in this case as 
well. 
Due to the fact that Tashina simply joined Morgan's arguments in the district 
court and the issue was decided solely on the evidence and argument submitted by 
Morgan, and Tashina's recognition that Morgan's case will control hers, Tashina adopts 
the arguments Morgan has made in his case at the Court of Appeals. Morgan's 
opening and reply briefs are therefore attached to this brief as Exhibits A and B and 
Morgan's arguments are incorporated herein by reference. 
Tashina does wish to address the State's assertion that the issue is moot 
because other chemicals, JWH-019 and JWH-210, were also found and there is no 
dispute that those chemicals are controlled substances. (Respondent's Brief, docket 
no. 40428, p.4 n1 .) Tashina acknowledges that a determination that AM-2201 was not 
criminal would not necessary result in a complete dismissal of the charges as the other 
chemicals were admitted to be covered by the controlled substances act. However, a 
determination in her favor would have dramatically altered the trial and given her a 
mistake of fact defense. 
Morgan testified that the only chemical he applied was AM-2201. (Tr., p.1463, 
Ls.19-25.) Thus, if the jury had been instructed that AM-2201 was legal, it could easily 
have concluded that the only chemical Morgan, and by extension, Tashina, intended to 
use was a legal one and that any application of JWH-019 or 210 was a mistake. If a 
mistake of fact negates the existence of the required mental state it serves as a 
defense. State v. Oar, 129 Idaho 337, 344 (1996); I.C. § 18-201(1). A conspiracy 
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consists of three things: 1) an agreement between two or more persons to accomplish 
an illegal objective, 2) coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of that 
objective, and 3) the intent necessary to commit the underlying substantive crime. 
State v. Rolon, 146 Idaho 684, 690 (Ct. App. 2008). The jury could easily have 
determined, under the facts of this case, that the only chemical intentionally placed on 
the plants was AM-2201 and that application of the other chemicals was a mistake. In 
such a case, Tashina would not have the intent to accomplish an illegal objective or the 
intent to commit the underlying crime. 
Thus, the district court's order removed a mistake of fact defense that Tashina 
could have pursued at trial. The issue is therefore not moot and this case must be 
remanded for further proceedings. 
11. 
The District Court Erred By Instructing The Jury That A Mistake Of Law Is Not A 
Defense To The Conspiracy Charges 
A Introduction 
Tashina asserts that the district court erred by instructing the jury that ignorance 
or mistake of law is not a defense. An element of conspiracy is an agreement between 
two or more persons to accomplish an illegal objective. Individuals who believe their 
actions are legal do not have an agreement to accomplish an illegal objective. Thus, 
the district court erred when, over an objection by counsel, it instructed the jury that a 
mistake of law is no defense. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The question whether the jury has been properly instructed is a question of law 
over which this Court exercises free review. State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65, 844 
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P.2d 691, 694 (1992). When reviewing jury instructions, this Court determines whether 
the instructions as a whole, and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect applicable 
law. State v. Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 942 (Ct. App. 1993). Where, as here, there is 
an objection at trial, once the appellant establishes error, the burden is on the State to 
demonstrate that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Perry, 
150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010). 
C. Ignorance or Mistake of The Law Is A Defense To Conspiracy 
Tashina was charged under both the general conspiracy statute, I.C. § 18-1701, 
and the conspiracy provision of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, I.C. § 37-
2732(f). (R., p.30.) Pursuant to I.C. § 18-1701, a general criminal conspiracy is defined 
as follows: 
If two (2) or more persons combine or conspire to commit any crime or 
offense prescribed by the laws of the state of Idaho, and one (1) or more 
of such persons does any act to effect the object of the combination or 
conspiracy, each shall be punishable upon conviction in the same manner 
and to the same extent as is provided under the laws of the state of Idaho 
for the punishment of the crime or offenses that each combined to commit. 
The conspiracy provision of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act similarly provides: 
If two (2) or more persons conspire to commit any offense defined in [the 
Uniform Controlled Substances] act, said persons shall be punishable by a 
fine or imprisonment, or both, which may not exceed the maximum 
punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the 
object of the conspiracy. 
I.C. § 37-2732(f). 
Idaho appellate courts have stated that a conspiracy consists of 1) an agreement 
between two or more persons to accomplish an illegal objective, 2) coupled with one or 
more overt acts in furtherance of that objective, and 3) the intent necessary to commit 
the underlying substantive crime. State v. Rolon, 146 Idaho 684, 690 (Ct. App. 2008) 
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(citing State v. Lopez, 140 Idaho 197, 199 (Ct. App. 2004) and State v. Munhall, 118 
Idaho 602, 606 (Ct. App. 1990). Conspiracy is thus a specific intent crime that requires 
the intent to agree to the conspiracy and the intent to commit the offense which of the 
object of the conspiracy. See id. 
In this case, the State filed a motion in limine requesting that the court instruct 
the jury that ignorance of the law was not a defense. (R., p.249.) Tashina objected. 
(R., pp.277, 279.) She then objected further at the jury instruction conference at trial. 
(Tr., p.2109, Ls.9-25.) The district court ultimately instructed the jury that a mistake or 
ignorance of the law was not a defense. (R., p.405.)2 
Tashina acknowledges that, generally, ignorance or a mistake of the law is not a 
defense. However, conspiracy is different, because the first element an agreement to 
accomplish an illegal objective. See Rolon, 146 Idaho at 690. If the defendants in a 
conspiracy truly believe that what they are doing is legal, they do not have the intent to 
accomplish an illegal objective. It does not appear that Idaho appellate courts have 
resolved this specific issue but caselaw from other jurisdictions is persuasive. 
In a case involving a conspiracy to violate state security laws, the Arizona 
Supreme Court has stated, 
Conspiracy is a crime that requires a mens rea, or specific intent, even if 
the crime the conspirators are agreeing to commit does not in itself require 
such intent. 
2 After trial, Tashina withdrew a motion for judgment of acquittal in exchange for the 
dismissal of the destruction of evidence charge. (8/21/12 Tr., p.6, L.11 - p.7, L.24.) 
Counsel for Tashina stated that he was going to copy the public defender's motion. 
(8/21/12 Tr., p.7, Ls.24.) Several other codefendants filed a motion for a new trial 
coupled with a motion for a judgment of acquittal and re-raised the mistake of law issue 
in the motion for a new trial. The district court granted the motion for a new trial and the 
State has appealed that order in those cases. However, because the agreement in this 
case made no mention of a motion for a new trial being withdrawn in exchange for 
dismissal of the destruction charge, and further made no mention of appellate rights, the 
agreement does not bar litigation of this issue on appeal. 
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We agree with the California court that: 
" . . . even though a conspiracy has as its object the commission of an 
offense which can be committed without any specific intent, there is no 
criminal conspiracy absent a specific intent to violate the law. That is, 
to uphold a conviction for conspiracy to commit a 'public welfare offense' 
there must be a showing that the accused knew of the law and intended to 
violate it." People v. Marsh, 58 Cal.2d 732, 743, 376 P.2d 300, 307, 26 
Cal.Rptr. 300, 307 (1962). 
Accord, United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C.Cir.1976), cert. 
den. 429 U.S. 1120, 97 S.Ct. 1155, 51 L.Ed.2d 570 (1977); 
Commonwealth v. Benesch, 290 Mass. 125, 194 N.E. 905 (1935); 
People v. Harris, 294 N.Y. 424, 63 N.E.2d 17 (1945); People v. Powell, 63 
N.Y. 88 (1875). 
Because the trial court in the present case specifically ruled that no 
intent to violate a known law need be shown for the State to prove a 
conspiracy charge, and because evidence of good faith was rejected, 
Gunnison's conspiracy conviction must fall. 
State v. Gunnison, 618 P.2d 604,608 (1980) (emphasis added). Further: 
The crime of conspiracy has been widely regarded as involving a 
consciously criminal agreement and is for that reason blameworthy and 
punishable in itself: "conspiracy imports a corrupt agreement between 
not less than two with guilty knowledge on the part of each." 
Id. at 607 (citing Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 92 (1934) (emphasis added). The 
Court of Appeals of California has recently stated, "[the] Defendant's good faith mistake 
of law, while not a defense to the crime of selling marijuana, was a defense to the 
conspiracy to commit that crime." People v. Urziceanu, 132 Cal. App. 4th 747, 775 
(2005). "To commit the crime of conspiracy, defendant must have had the specific 
intent to violate the marijuana laws (i.e., he must have known what he was doing was 
illegal and he must have intended to violate the law) before he can properly be 
convicted of conspiracy to violate those laws. Because conspiracy requires a specific 
intent, a good faith mistake of law would provide defendant with a defense." Id. at 776. 
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This reasoning is especially persuasive considering that California defines a 
conspiracy much the same way Idaho does: "The elements of the crime of conspiracy 
are generally described as follows: 'A criminal conspiracy exists where it is established 
that there was an unlawful agreement to commit a crime between two or more people, 
and an overt act in furtherance of the agreement."' Id. at 776 (citations omitted.) Thus, 
there must be an agreement to commit an illegal act as well as an overt act, just like 
Idaho law requires. 
Conspiracy is different than other crimes. It is the criminal agreement itself that 
is blameworthy and punishable regardless of whether the underlying crime occurs. See 
Gunnison, 618 P.2d at 607. The agreement must therefore be consciously criminal in 
order to be punishable. See id. A mistake of law does, therefore, negate the specific 
intent element of conspiracy because, with a mistake of law, there is no agreement 
between two or more persons to accomplish an illegal objective. See Rolon, 146 Idaho 
at 690. Thus, the district court erred by instructing the jury that mistake of law was not a 
defense to the conspiracy charges. 
Further, this error was not harmless. Evidence was introduced at trial from which 
a jury could have reasonably concluded that Tashina lacked the necessary intent to 
violate the law. According to the detective, Tashina stated that she was "well aware of' 
what was happening at the warehouse and the Red Eye Hut and that she had been to 
both locations." (Tr., p.832, Ls.1-4.) Detective Andreoli testified that Tashina stated 
that, "what we are doing is completely legal" because other people in Boise were doing 
the same thing. (Tr., p.832, Ls.8-14.) Morgan testified that he believed his actions were 
legal and that he had documentation which supported his position. (Tr., p.1426, Ls.12-
14.) Considering these facts, the jury could have easily concluded that Tashina 
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reasonably believed that the "potpourri" was legal and could have prevailed on a 
mistake of law defense. 
CONCLUSION 
Tashina requests that the district court's order denying the motion to dismiss be 
reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. Further, she requests that, 
due to instructional error, that her judgment of conviction be vacated and her case 
remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this 15th day of October, 2013. 
JUSTI MlrnRTIS 
Deputy ~te Appellate Public Defender 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Alley was charged with the manufacturing and distribution of a controlled substance, 
to wit: _"spice" and/or "potpourri." R 000032 to 000036 (Indictment). It was alleged that Mr. 
Alley's manufacturing and distribution ran from November 2011 through September 2011. R. 
000134 to 000170 (Affidavit for Search Warrant). During the time that Mr. Alley was engaged in 
the practice of manufacturing and selling "spice", the law in Idaho was in flux. Rat 000097 to 
000103. 
On October 15, 2010 Governor Otter signed into law a rule promulgated by the Idaho 
Board of Phamiacy in the previous month. Id The rule made it illegal to possess, manufacture, 
or distribute some chemicals that had been used to make "spice." Id. Those chemicals were: CP 
47,497, HU-210, JWH-018, JWH-073, JWH-200, JWH-081, and JWH-250. Id. The Board of 
Pharmacy rule remained in effect until March 10, 2011, when House Bill 139 was signed into 
law by Governor Otter and took immediate effect. Id: at 000102 to 000103. Whereas the Board 
of Pharmacy Rule prohibited chemicals by name, HB 139 prohibited substances by describing 
groups of chemicals, and further prohibited certain chemical alterations to the prohibited 
chemicals. Compare R. at 0000098 to R at 000172 to 000176. 
In between the time the Board of Pharmacy promulgated its rule and the time HB 139 
was signed into Jaw, many in the "spice" industry began lookmg for chemicals that would be 
compliant with the language contained in HB 139. Rat 000094. The language ofHB 139 was 
available, and prior to its passage the language was passed along to Dr. Richard Parent along 
with a list of potential chemical candidates for use in "spice." Id. After comparing the language 
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of the bill with the chemical structures of the list provided to him, Dr. Parent was able to 
determine that some chemicals were not covered by the language of.HB 139. Id. Specifically, Dr. 
Parent concluded that AM-2201 was not covered by the language.Rat 000109 to 000110. 
This information soon became common knowledge throughout Idaho, and many spice 
products began using AM-2201 even before March 10, 2011. To ensure compliance with the 
law, many manufacturers and distributors would get their base chemicals tested to ensure that 
they were not "dirty" (i.e. containing chemicals covered under HB 139). See id. This had to be 
done since one cannot tell by simply looking at a chemical what the chemical is, just as one 
cannot look at a "spice" product and know with what, if any, chemical or chemicals the plant 
matter has been treated. As with many others in the industry, Mr. Alley was actively engaged in 
the practice of testing chemicals shipped to him to ensure those chemicals did not contain 
prohibited substances. Rat 000134 to 000170. 
Mr. Alley was not accused of possessing and/or distributing anything illegal prior to the 
implementation of HB 139. R. 000032 to 000036; 000134 to 000170. The primary instances of 
distribution were samples of "spice" taken and/or purchased at various times throughout 
September 2011. Id. Specifically, the product involved is a brand called Twizted Potpourri. Id. 
The State ultimately came into possession of three different products from the Twizted Potpourri 
line: Fire, Ultra Hypnotic, and Blueberry. R. 000161. Those samples were obtained through 
dumpster diving and controlled buys. Rat 000150 to 000155 and 000161. 
Of the samples tested, a total of three different chemicals were identified by the State as 
alleged controlled substances R. at 000154 to 000155 and 000166 to 000167. On September 13, 
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2011, some product was taken from a dumpster and some of it was tested. R. at 000150 to 
000156. It appears the seized product was potentially a part of the Twizted Potpourri line but it 
is not clear which sub-product it was intended to be (i.e. Fire, Ultra-hypnotic, or Blueberry). See 
id. That sample was sent in for testing on September 14, 2011 and found to contain AM-2201 
and JWH-210. Id. Another sample obtained via dumpster diving on September 12, 2011 was 
ultimately found to contain only AM-2201. R. at 000148 to 000156. That product was identified 
as Fire Twizted Potpourri. Id. 
Finally, on September 26, 2011 a controlled buy was made in which the State took 
control of one sample each of Fire, Ultra-hypnotic, and Blueberry. R. at 000159 to 000162. Each 
sample was tested. R. at 000167. Fire was confumed to contain only AM~2201 as was 
Blueberry. Id. Ultra Hypnotic was tested as containing JWH-019. Id. The end result is that it 
appears from the State's evidence that only two samples have ever contained anything other than 
AM-2201, with one sample containing JWH-210 and the other JWH-019. 
The State believes that AM-2201 is a controlled substance and makes no distinction 
between AM-2201 and other prohibited substances. The Defendant disagrees and thus filed his 
motion to dismiss based on the contention that AM-2201 was legal in the State in ofidaho at the 
time he possessed it. R. at 000079 to 000176. The Idaho Legislature amended the relevant statute 
in 2012 and struck the language at issue in the present case and replaced it with the language "to 
any extent." 2012 Idaho Sess. Laws 181 (hereinafter HB 502). Had the language used in HB 502 
been in effect at the time of Mr. Alley's possession he would concede the language included 
chemicals such as AM-2201. Nevertheless; the entirety of Mr. Alley's conduct was prior to the 
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passage of HB 502 and in fact Mr. Alley's case may have been a driving factor in the 
Legislature's decision to amend the language of the statute. 
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Defendant presented expert testimony from two 
doctors of organic chemistry. They both testified that AM-2201 has a structure that substantially 
differs from the structures prohibited by Idaho Code 37 § 2705(d)(30)(a), and thus, is not a 
controlled substance under Idaho Law. 
Specifically, Dr. Owen McDougal testified, "The chain itself [in AM-2201] is an alkyl 
halide. So it has the fluorine as a functional group off of the hydrocarbon chain. In the statute it 
specifies an alkyl group. Alkyl groups are nothing but carbon and hydrogen. When you add a 
halogen or some other hetero atom, like oxygen or nitrogen [or fluorine], you create functionality 
in the molecule, and it becomes a different class of compound." Tr. of Hearing on Motion to 
Dismiss, pp 3940 ( emphasis added). Likewise, Dr. DeJesus testified that AM-2201 has a 
"flouro-alkane chain" and is thus not an alkyl group, see Tr. pp. 118 to 125, and that, "[I]n the 
case of substitution other than carbon, such as the one that we are dealing with in this case right 
here [AM-2201], it then becomes another :functional group. It is no longer an alkyl group." Tr. 
pp. 131. 
Despite this testimony, the District Court denied the motion on the basis that in passing 
HB 139, the legislature intended to ban chemicals used in "spice", that is, those that mimic the 
"hallucinatory effects" of marijuana. R at 000308. The District Court turned to legislative intent 
without having ever found any portion of the statute to be vague, ambiguous, or in conflict with 
other law. R. at 297-318. Furthermore, the District Court interpreted the legislative intent as 
7 
applying to the pharmacological effects of certain substances without regard to actions of the 
legislature suggesting precisely the opposite. Id. 
Based on the concerns Mr. Alley had with the decision as issued by the District Court Mr. 
Alley filed a Motion to Reconsider. R. at 334~63. The District Court ruled from the bench on the 
motion and upheld its prior decision on the same grounds and reasoning as set forth in the 
written decision. R. at 379. As a result of the fmdings and conclusions of the District Court Mr. 
Alley entered a conditional plea of guilty. R. at 447-49. 
Mr. Alleys conditional plea was based on the Court's denial of his motion to dismiss. See 
R. at 000297 to 000318. It is Mr. Alley's position that the District Court erred by denying his 
motion to dismiss and his subsequent motion reconsider, because Idaho Code § 2705(d)(30)(a) 
(2011) did not prohibit the possession, manufacturing, or distribution of the chemical AM-220 I. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
On appeal, Defendant argues that the judgment of conviction should be overturned 
because the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss was in error. Defendant maintains: 
(1) AM-2201 was not prohibited by the relevant statutory language in place at the time of the 
alleged offense (which has since been amended to be broader and now unarguably prohibits AM-
2201), specifically: 
a) The district court improperly turned to legislative intent in interpreting Idaho Code§ 
2705( d)(30)(a); 
b) The dis1rict court's improperly considered the alleged effects of AM-2201 in 
interpreting § 2705(d)(30)(a); 
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c) § 2705(d)(30)(a) is not ambiguous and does not prohibit AM-2201; and 
d) In the alternative, to the extent§ 2705(d)(30Xa) is ambiguous, the district court should 
have applied the rule of lenity, and if it had done so, it should have concluded that 
2705(dX30)(a) does not prohibit AM-2201. 
(2) that the interpretation afforded I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(a) by the district court renders it 
unconstitutionally vague. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court incorrectlf determined that AM-2201 is prohibited by I.C. § 37-
2705(d)(30) 
The question of whether a substance is designated in the Controlled Substance Act as a 
controlled substance is a question of law for the court. State v. Hobbs, 101 Idaho 262, 262 
(1980); State v. Kellog, 102 Idaho 628 (1981). As such, appellate review is de novo. See State v. 
Doe, 92 P. 3d 521, 523-24; 140 Idaho 271 (2004). 
A. The Court improperly resorted to examining legislative history without first 
determining whether the statutory language was ambiguous. 
In interpreting statutory language, a court must give the words their plain, usual, and 
ordinary meaning. Where statw;ory language is not ambiguous, the court should not consult 
legislative history or other extrinsic evidence. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ Med Ctr., 151 
Idaho 889,893,265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011) (citing City of Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 123 Idaho 
665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 (1993)). In its order denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the 
indictment, the District Court judge cited the language in Verska prohibiting it from resorting to 
legislative history if it determined the statute's plain language was unambiguous. 
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Despite its correct recitation of the law with regard to statutory interpretation, the District 
Court then proceeded to resort to legislative history to conclude that the legislature intended LC. 
§ 37-2705(d)(30) to prohibit AM~2201. The Court's reliance on legislative intent is evidenced by 
the Court's framing of the issue when it asked, "what did the legislature intend to add to Schedule 
I?" R. at 300 and 304. The Court then turned to the entirety of I.C. § 37-2705(d) and concluded 
that "[b]y stripping the statute down to the component parts to be construed it is fairly ease to 
discern the intention of the legislature[.]" R. at 306. Other language evidencing the Court's 
reliance on the legislative intent includes, "[t]he minutes of the legislative committees," "the 
Idaho legislature unambiguously intended to add synthetic imitators of marijuana to Schedule 
I... •t and "[i]t was the intent of the legislature." R. at 308 ( emphasis added). 
Based on the legislative history, the Court concluded that the legislature "unambiguously 
intended to add synthetic imitators of marijuana to Schedule I and did so in broad language that 
encompasses AM-2201." R. at 307-08. That is, the District Court ultimately concluded that the 
statute was unambiguous, but reached its conclusion that the language in I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30) 
prohibiting "THC 'and/or synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar 
chemical structure' is referring to synthetic marijuana or synthetic substances that mimic the 
hallucinog~nic properties of marijuana" by resorting to legislative history. 
Accordingly, the District Court erred in resorting to legislative history first, and then 
using that legislative history to conclude that the unambiguous language of the statute prohibited 
AM-2201. 
What is more is that in making its analysis the District Court omitted any discussion of, 
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or consideration for, other acts of the legislature when passing HB 139. Specifically, the removal 
of certain language from the relevant section of the code. The language that was removed looked 
expressly at the pharmacological effects of a substance. The remaining language referred only to 
the structural elements of the substance in question. 
The version of Idaho Code § 37-2705(dX30) that was in place prior to the 2011 
legislative passage of House Bill 139 read: 
Tetrahydrocannabinols. Synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in the 
plant, or in the resinous extractives of Cannabis, sp. and/or synthetic substances, 
derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical structure and pharmacological 
activity such as the following: 
I.C. § 37-2705( dX30)(2010)( emphasis added). 
The 2011 House Bill 139 that added subsection (ii)(a), which was the subject of the 
arguments before this Court, also removed from I.e. § 37-2705(d)(30) the term 
"pharmacological activity" so that it now reads: 
Tetrahydrocannabinols-~or synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in the plant, 
or in the resinous ex:tractives of Cannabis, sp. and/or synthetic substances, derivatives, 
and their isomers with similar chemical structure such as the following: 
I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(201 l)(emphasis added). 
The removal of the language "pharmacological activity" is quite telling as it creates a 
plain reading of the statute that does not take into consideration 1:}le pharmacological or 
hallucinogenic effects a given substance may have. A plain reading of the relevant section of 
statute now requires looking solely at the structural elements of a substance in determining if it 
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contained within the purview of the statute. 
Indeed, the removal of the pharmacological reference in subsection (30) makes the statute 
more consistent with the language being added under subsection (30) in that all of the language 
contained in the subsections of (30) is entirely structural related. Those subsections, such as 
subsection (30)(a)--the subsection in question in the present case--describe naphthyls, indoles, 
nitrogen atoms on the indole ring, alkyls, alkenyls, cycloalkylmethyls, and cycloalkylethyls. All 
of those describe structures and not pharmacological effects of a given substance. Even more 
compelling is considering how fine a point is placed on the structural descriptions. Toe sole 
difference between an alkyl and alkenyl is the presence of one or more double bonds between 
two carbon atoms. Tr. at 40:22-42:9. The only difference between the cycloalkylmethyls and 
cycloalkylethyls is the relative number of hydrogen to carbon atoms present Tr. at 43:2-44:3. 
For the legislature to break down structural descriptions to the point of discerning between a 
single bond and double bond or a single carbon atom is indicative of a severe focus on structure 
and not effect. 
The result is that while the district court should not have considered the legislative history 
in reaching its conclusion even where it did consider such history it did not accoW1t for the 
legislature's actions in removing references to pharmacological effects and extreme focus on 
structure. For both reasons the district court's decision was improper and should. be overturned. 
B. The Court's determination that LC. § 37-2705(d) prohibits all "synthetic 
substances that mimic the hallucinogenic properties of marijuana" was error. 
The proper procedure would have been to begin by examining the plain language of LC. 
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§ 37~2705(d)(30), which defines tetrahydrocannabinol, "synthetic equivalents of the substances 
contained in the plant or in the resinous extractives of Cannabis," and, as relevant here, 
"synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical structure [to THC]" as 
Schedule I drugs. Had the District Court followed this procedure, it would not have concluded · 
that the statute prohibits all "synthetic substances that mimic the hallucinogenic properties of 
marijuana," because the statutory language states that it is prohibiting substances with "similar 
chemical structure" to tetrahydrocannabinol (THC, the primary psychoactive chemical in 
marijuana) and other synthetic equivalents of the chemicals contained in marijuana. 
The District Court reached its erroneous conclusion by determining that, in enacting I.C. 
§ 37-2705(d)(30), the legislature was attempting to prohibit "spice" (plant matter combined with 
chemicals that have similar effects to THC or marijuana), and concluding that the list of 
prohibited chemical structures following the language "such as" in I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30) was 
provided merely by way of example and thus could not narrow the language preceding the words 
"such as." 
The District Court was correct in concluding that the plain meaning of "such as'' is that 
whatever list follows, it is non-exhaustive. However, the fact that the statute does not 
specifically list every chemical it prohibits does not render the list meaningless. In detennining 
the meaning of a statute, courts must give effect to all the words of the statute so that none will 
be rendered void, superfluous, or redundant. Hillside Landscape Const., Inc. v. City of Lewiston, 
151 Idaho 749,264 P.3d 388 (2011) (citing State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308, 
309 (2006)). Presumably, the legislature did not expend time and resources drafting a list of 
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prohibited chemicals idly, but rather to instruct the courts as to what it meant by "similar 
chemical structure." See Stonecipher v. Stonecipher, %3 P.2d 1168, 131 Idaho 731 (1998) (non-
exhaustive list added to statute by amendment "clarified the language" of the statute). 
Moreover, contrary to the District Court's conclusion, non-exhaustive lists can and, 
indeed, do narrow the general language they explain. See State v. Cobb, 969 P.2d 244, 132 
Idaho 19 5 (1998) ( disturbing the peace ordinance survived constitutional vagueness challenge 
because it included a non-exclusive list of examples of proscribed conduct). It is a rule of 
statutory construction that "where general words of a statute follow an enumeration of persons or 
things, such general words will be construed as meaning persons or things of like or similar class 
or character to those specifically enumerated." State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 831, 25 P.3d 850, 
854 (2001). According to this rule, to determine whether AM-2201 was included within the 
general term "synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical structure 
[to THC]," the District Court should have considered whether AM-2201 is of a like or similar 
class, character, and severity to those classes of chemical structures specifically enumerated. 
See, e.g., State v. Kavajecz, 80 P.Jd 1083, 1087, 139 Idaho 482 (2003) (criminal statute using a 
non-exclusive list does not prohibit conduct of similar class and character but lesser severity); 
Johnson v. Sunshine Min. Co., Inc., 684 P. 2d 268, I 06 Idaho 866 ( 1984) (non-exhaustive list of 
recreational activities that included "pleasure driving" also encompassed motorcycling for 
pleasure because it was sufficiently similar to the activities listed). 
Further, the examples included in a non-exhaustive list can also narrow the definition of 
another listed example. In Cowles Pub. Co. v. Kootenai County Bd, 159 P.3d 896, 901 (Idaho 
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2007), the Idaho Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether email correspondence 
between a public employee and her supervisor was covered by the personnel records exemption 
from disclosure under the state's public records act. The act did not define "personnel records" 
but instead provided a non-exhaustive list of exempt personnel records. Although one of the 
listed examples was "correspondence" and the Court acknowledged that the emails were a type 
of correspondence, it held that "in context, it becomes clear that . . . only those types of 
correspondence typically found in a personnel file [are exempt] ... [the emails] are informal 
communications between an employee and her supervisor, unrelated to personnel 
administration." Id. at 902. That is, even though "correspondence" was specifically included in 
a non-exclusive list, the Court held that, in context, the meaning of "correspondence" was 
narrowed by the other items included in the list. 
Here, the District Court refused to undertake this analysis. Rather, it improperly 
examined the legislative history to determine that the statute was intended to "deal with the so-
called 'spice' problem" and thus interpreted the general language as prohibiting all substances 
that could have similar hallucinatory effects to marijuana, regardless of their lack of similarity to 
the chemical structures listed in the statute with regard to structure or potency. Rather than 
engage in the kind of statutory interpretation required by Idaho's case law, the District Court 
rendered the legislature's non-exhaustive list meaningless. 
Indeed, the non-exhaustive list provided in the code includes subsections (a) through (i), 
most of which contained yet another list within them. For example, subsection (a) contains a 
subset list of "alkyl, alkenyl, cycloalkylmethyl, cycloalkylethyl or 2-( 4-morpholinyl)ethyl." As 
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with any other words in the statute these words too, must be given effect and cannot be rendered 
superfluous or meaningless. 
Nevertheless, the district court's opinion does not consider itself with the meaning and 
application of those terms or what purpose they serve in the overall application of the statute. Yet 
they do serve a purpose, That purpose is to place context and limits to the applicability of the 
statute. Those words denote very specific chemical structures that are intended to fall within the 
purview of the statute. In short, they define the scope of the statute. 
Where a chemical falls outside of the type and nature being described by those terms it by 
definition falls outside of the list of chemicals expressly covered in the statute. As noted by Dr. 
McDougal, the chemical AM-2201 does not just fall outside of the scope of chemicals described 
in subsection (d)(30Xii)(a) it is in a different "class" altogether. Tr. at 39:940:6. It is this 
structural separation between AM-2201 and the chemicals described in (d)(30)(ii)(a) that places 
AM-2201 outside of the scope of the statute and therefore legal under the law in effect at the 
time. Because the district court looked solely to similarity in pharmacological effect and 
disregards the limiting nature of the structural descriptions in the statute the decision of the 
district court should be reversed. 
C. AM-2201 is not included among the substances prohibited by I.C. § 37-2705(d) 
A correct statutory analysis leads to a conclusion that AM-2201 is not a prohibited 
substance. As noted by the District Court, I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30), unlike other sections of LC. § 
37-2705, does not prohibit specific chemicals. Rather, it prohibits 'Tt]etrahydrocannabinols or 
synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in ... Cannabis, sp. and/or synthetic 
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substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical structure such as the following:" 
There are two subsections, the first of which prohibits THC and its optical isomers, and the 
second of which prohibits "the following synthetic drugs" and then lists in each of its sub-
subsections 11any compound structurally derived from 11 one of six chemicals "by substitution at 
the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl, alkenyl, cycloalkylmethyl, cycloalkylethyl or 2-( 4-
morpholinyl)ethyl, whether or not further substituted in the indole ring to any extent, whether or 
not substituted in the naphthyl ring to any extent." 
In the present context the "non-exhaustive" list is exceptionally narrow. The differences 
between the examples are the·relative number of hydrogen to carbon atoms (cycloalkylmethyl or 
cycloalkylethyl), the number of bonds between carbon atoms (alkenyls), and the length of a 
hydrogen and carbon chain (alkyls). I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(a). All the examples hinge around 
differences in chemical chains containing only hydrogen and carbon. Consequently, at the 
molecular level, all non-hydrogen and carbon chains fall outside the list Otherwise, one would 
expect that the list would have covered non-hydrogen and carbon type substituents. 1 Due to the 
highly technical, specific, and minute distinctions between the examples this Court should take 
great caution in applying the "such as" language beyond the types of examples provided. AM-
2201 is not of the type listed because it contains a non-hydrogen and carbon atom substituent 
It should be noted here that the district court never made any findings as whether AM-
1The code was amended in 2012 to accomplish precisely this, as it removed the language limiting 
the examples to alkyls, alkenyls, etc., and replaced that language with ,.to any extent," thereby 
including all possible constituents in the example list. Compare I.C. § 37-3705(d)(30)(a) (2011) 
and 37-2705(d)(30)(a) (2012). 
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2201 was expressly covered by the language in (d)(30)(ii)(a). The district court rested almost 
entirely on the language contained in (d)(30) and on its conclusions that AM-2201 allegedly 
exhibits pharmacological effects similar to THC. As such, to the extent this Court addresses the 
issue of whether AM-2201 is described in (d)(30)(ii)(a) it is doing so independent of the 
conclusions of the district court. 
D. To the extent the statute is ambiguous as to whether AM-2201 is prohibited, the 
rule of lenity requires that the statute be interpreted in Defendants' favor. 
The rule of lenity, as applied to criminal statutes, requires that any ambiguity should be 
strictly construed in favor of the accused. State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383,386 (Ct. App. 
1998); see also Capital Care Ctr. v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 129 Idaho 773, 776, 
(1997). In construing statutory language in the criminal code, the court in Herrera-Brito held 
that "[aJn act cannot be held criminal under a statute unless it clearly appears from the language 
used that the legislature so intended." Id. at 387 ( emphasis supplied). The order of the language 
in that quote is essential to the proper application of the rule of lenity. The Court should not look 
to, or apply, legislative intent. Rather, the language of the statute itself must make evident the 
intent of the legislature to criminalize the specific conduct of the accused. 
This di~nction is further explained by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
[wJhile the appellant may be correct that it was the legislative intent to deter not only a 
person who actually possesses a gun, but all principals involved in a crime in which a 
dangerous weapon was employed, we cannot make such an interpretation for the 
legislature when no such intention appears from the language of the statute. To hold 
otherwise would be supplying what the legislature left vague and this we cannot do. 
State v. Morrison, 143 Idaho 459, 461 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting State v. Thompson, 101 
Idaho 430,438 (1980) (emphasis supplied). 
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Indeed, in Morrison the Court of Appeals found that the legislative history supported the State' s 
position but concluded it was bound by the "admonition in Thompson that the intention of the 
statute must appear in its language" in order to comport with the rule of lenity. Morrison, 143 
Idaho at 461. 
Any ambiguity in a criminal statute must be resolved in favor of the Defendant See also 
McNally v. U.S., 483 U.S. 350 (1987). To the extent the District Court relied upon extrinsic 
evidence of legislative intent to determine the legal status of AM-2201, it has essentially already 
implicitly concluded that the statutory language is ambiguous in this regard. The District Court's 
failure to explicitly recognize this ambiguity and to construe it in favor of the Defendant was 
error. 
II. As applied to Defendants, LC. § 37-2705{d) is void for vagueness 
In the alternative, Defendant submits that the statute is void for vagueness. Where the 
constitutionality of a statute is challenged, appellate review is de novo. State v. Korsen, 138 
Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003); State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 34 218 P.3d 10, 13 (Ct. 
App. 2009). 
A criminal defendant asserting an argument that a statute is unconstitutionally vague 
bears the burden of overcoming a rebuttable presumption of statutory validity. State v. Korsen, 
138 Idaho 706, 711 (2003). To meet his burden and overcome the presumption, a defendant can 
show either that the statute failed to provide fair notice of what conduct is illegal or that the 
statute failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that the police lacked appropriate guidelines in 
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the statute's enforcement. Id. 
Vague statutes violate the due process rights of an individual under the federal 
constitution as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment, and also violate the due process 
rights of Idahoans under the Idaho Constitution. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 
(1972) and City of Lewiston v. Mathewson, 78 Idaho 34 7 (1956). Typically, a statute that "either 
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must 
necessarily guess at its meaning,· and differ as to its application" is unconstitutionally vague. 
Capital Care Center v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, 129 Idaho 773, 776, (1997) 
(internal citations omitted). In the case of a criminal statute, there is less tolerance for vague 
language than what might otherwise be permitted under a "civil or non-criminal statute." Id. 
(citing Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co .• 117 Idaho 706, 716 (1990)). Indeed, when analyzing a civil or 
non-criminal statute, the language is not impermissibly vague so long as "persons of ordinary 
intelligence can derive 'core meaning' from them." Kolar v. Cassia County Idaho, 142 Idaho 
346, 354 (2005). Perhaps this is because it has long been recognized that "in most English words 
and phrases there lurk uncertainties." State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584, 585 (1990Xciting Rose v. 
Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975)). 
However, noticeably absent from the vagueness test for criminal statutes is the "core 
meaning" element. Compare Capital Care Center, 129 Idaho at 776 and Kolar, 142 Idaho at 
354. It is not enough in the criminal context that the party accused of a criminal act should have 
understood the "core meaning" of the statute. Rather, the language must be sufficiently clear so 
that the accused should have known the precise conduct being prohibited or mandated. 
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Therefore, when it comes to criminal statutes, there can be little tolerance of the ''uncertainties" 
that "lurk" in "word and phrases" of the English language. 
In the criminal context, a statute must provide "fair warning of the conduct that it makes 
a crime" such that the conduct punished as criminal (here, possession of the chemical AM-2201) 
is "plainly and unmistakably" within the provisions of a statute. State v. Kavajecz, 80 P.3d 1083, 
139 Idaho 482 (2003). So far as possible, to comport with due process requirements, criminal 
statutes must draw a clear line and provide "fair warning ... in language that the common world 
will understand" what the law intends to do if that line is crossed. Id ( citing United States v. 
Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 1224, 137 L.Ed.2d 432, 442 (1997)). 
Here, not only can the "common world" not understand which chemicals are prohibited 
under the statute, experts in the field of organic chemistry do not understand where the line is 
drawn. 
Defendant presented the. testimony of two highly qualified experts in the field in Dr. 
McDougal and Dr. De Jesus. Tr. pp. 29 to 174. Each has significant experience and education in 
the field of organic chemistry. Id., see also R 000187 to 000198. Both experts concluded that 
AM-2201 is not described under the statute. See id, see also R 000354 to 000363. Moreover, 
Defendant did not contact numerous experts and then pick only the ones that agreed with his 
position. The Defendant selected the experts based upon their qualifications and had each 
independently analyze AM-2201 under the statute. Defendant's experts unanimously concluded 
that AM-2201 was not described under the statute. 
The State elicited expert testimony from a State lab technician ( employed by the State 
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and under the direction of the State Police) who testifed that an "alkyl" is inclusive of 
"baloalkyls." The Defendant posits that this because the State is unable to find anyone with a 
doctorate level of education and unaffiliated with the State who would agree with the position of 
Mr. Sincerbeaux, the State's expert, who holds only a Bachelor's degree and is a longtime 
employee of the Sta~. 
Regardless, it is apparent from the conflicting expert testimony presented in this case that 
the statute fails to provide clear warning of what is prohibited. even to experts. Certainly, 
individuals of common intelligence · could conclude that because the substitutions listed as 
prohibited are all comprised entirely of carbon and hydrogen atoms, substitution by haloalkyl is 
not prohibited because haloalkyls include adding entirely different types of atoms (fluorine). 
A disagreement between experts does not inherently make a Jaw vague, but it is relevant 
to a determination of vagueness because the vagueness test itself asks how a person of common 
intelligence would view the statute. Consequently, where even experts cannot agree on the 
meaning of the language in a statute, one cannot expect that lay persons would be able to 
determine what is and is not intended to be prohibited with any reasonable accuracy. 
Likewise, although a subsequent clarifying amendment is not conclusive in a vagueness 
analysis, it is relevant to that analysis that the Idaho legislature has already taken steps to clarify 
and correct for the confusion created by the initial language in the statute. In the 2012 legislative 
session I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a) was amended to read; 
Any compound structurally derived from 3-(1-naphthoyl)indole or IH-indol-3- yl-(1-
naphthyl)methane by substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl, 
all:ceBYl, oyolo&lkylmetbyl, eyoloalkylethyl or 2 (4 moq:,holmyl)ethyl to any extent, 
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whether or not further substituted in the indole ring to any extent, whether or not 
substituted in the naphthyl ring to any extent.2 
LC.§ 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a) 2012 (emphasis and strikethrough added). 
While the language ''to any extent" is certainly more broad then the language it replaced 
it nevertheless goes a long way in making the statute clear. As amended, individuals are placed 
on notice that any substituent, irrespective of whether it is alkyl, haloalkyl, or one of the many 
other variants, is prohibited. There is no question that this language includes the chemical AM-
2201. 
Even if the vagueness in the statutory language does not rise to the level of 
unconstitutionality, Judge Greenwood's interpretation of the statute as prohibiting any substance 
with similar "hallucinatory effects" to marijuana introduces unconstitutional vagueness, 
especially given that the effects of chemicals in the human body cannot be determined based 
solely on the chemical structures of the compounds. State v. Doe, 92 P.3d 521, 140 Idaho 271 
(2004) (statute that may not be facially overbroad or void for vagueness may nonetheless 
interpreted in a manner that renders it unconstitutionally overbroad or vague); State v. Richards, 
896 P.2d 357, 127 Idaho 31 (Ct Appeals 1995) (infumity for vagueness may be avoided by 
interpreting the statute in a manner that comports with constitutional limitations). 
Also relevant is that Defendant made a good faith effort to comply with Idaho law. 
2 This was the language used in the federal law recently passed and was the model language 
recommended for some time. For some unknown reason Idaho elected not to use the model 
language and instead chose to list specific substituents. Only after the hearing in State v. Alley 
did the State reevaluate the language and amended the language to match the model language 
and make the law clear. 
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Defendant retained experts in organic chemistry to interpret the law, and tested "spice" to ensure 
that chemicals that were clearly prohibited, such as JWH-018, were not present. Although a 
good faith subjective belief that conduct is n~t illegal is not a defense to illegal action, it is 
relevant to establishing that reasonable people would necessarily disagree as to what the statute 
prohibited, and, thus, that the statute's lack of clarity presents a due process concern, at least 
insofar as whether substitution by haloalkyl is prohibited. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of conviction entered in this case should be VACATED, because it was 
based on Defendant's plea of guilty, which was conditional upon the District Court's denial of 
Defendant's motion to dismiss, which was based on an error of law. Specifically, the District 
Court erred in determining that AM-2201 was, at the relevant time, a controlled substance under 
Idaho law. Specifically, the court erred by examining legislative history without first :finding a 
statutory ambiguity, by resorting to the alleged effects of AM-2201 rather than limiting its 
analysis to the chemical's structure, and by either failing to correctly interpret the statute's 
unambiguous language or, in the alternative, failing to apply the rule of lenity to interpret 
ambiguous language in Defendant's favor. In the alternative, to the extent that the statute can be 
interpreted as prohibiting AM-2201, it is void for vagueness. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of March, 2013. 
Ryan Holdaway 
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant 
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ARGUMENT 
The State takes issue with the Defendant's appeal on three grounds in its Brief of 
Respondent (hereinafter "BOR"). The first is that the district court judge applied the plain 
meaning of the statute and did not rely on legislative intent to interpret the statute in question. 
The second is that the statute was clear and unambiguous and therefore not unconstitutionally 
vague. Finally. the Defendant's appeal is moot. The Defendant will address each in turn. 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT'S OPINION CLEARLY RELIED ON LEGISLATIVE 
INTENT IN INTERPRETING THE STATUTE WITHOUT FIRST APPLYING THE 
PLAIN AND COMMON MEANING OF THE WORDS AND fllRTHERMORE THE 
COURT LOOKED TO PHARMACOLOGlCAL EFFECT WHERE THAT LANGUAGE 
HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM THlt STATUTK 
The State suggests that the district court reached its conclusion by applying the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the words and then referenced legislative intent merely to show the 
consistency in the position (i.e. the legislative intent was apparent in the language of the statute.). 
However. the formatting and language of the opinion demonstrate that not to be true. First and 
foremost was the court's reliance on evidence and interpretations surrounding the alleged 
psychotropic effects of AM-2201. 
Without rehashing the argument made in Appellant's opemng brief the legislature 
removed language from the statute relating to the pharmacological effects of the substances in 
question and thereby rendered the statute entirely structure based. Appellant's Opening Brief, 10-
12 (Mar. 2013 ). Because the remaining language of the statute looked only to structure any 
analysis as to the pharmacological effect goes beyond the plain language of the statute. See I.C. § 
37-2705(d)(30). Nevertheless, the district court took into consideration alleged pharmacological 
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cflccts of A\1<220 I in determining it wns a substance the legislature intended to ban. R. at 306-
08 :md 3 13-15. Indeed. the court considered the pharmacological effects to be an a component in 
the anal:, sis when it stated. ''[t]he psychoactive substance in marijuana is Tetrahyrdocannibinol 
or Tl JC 'and/or synthetic substances. derivatives. and their isomers with similar chemical 
structure' is referring to synthetic marijuana or \Vlllhetic substances that mimic the 
hu/!11cinogenic properries of manjuana." R. at 307 (emphasis added). Later in its opinion the 
district cour1 discussed further the nature of the pharmacological effects it had identified through 
its own research with AM-2201. R. at 314-15. 
The discussion surrounding the effects of the chemical were in answering the question 
the court posed to itself asking "[i]n lay terms. is this substance [AM-2201 j a synthetic 
rnnnibinoid')" R. at 313. The district court's analysis went beyond the plain and ordinary words 
in the statute by looking to pharmacological effect where the legislature had removed language 
expressly relating to pharmacological effect and replaced it with structural language. Therefore 
the State incorrectly represents that the district court applied the plain language of the statute and 
the court's decision was in error. 
There is ample evidence in the cowi's written opinion that its interpretation was driven by 
legislative intent and not the plain language. On page four of the court's opinion it recites 
boilerplate language on the statutory construction but does not yield an interpretation of the plain 
language I.C. ~ 37-2705(d)(30) at that time. R. at 300. The cou1i then recites its understanding 
of the arguments relating to the chemistry of the substance in question and the statute. R. at 301-
304. Again. no interpretation of the statute is forthcoming in those pages. Then, the court states, 
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"[ a ]s stated by Dr. De J csus. the Idaho legislature is not a body of chemists. The issue is what did 
the legislature intend to add to Schedule I?" R. at 304. Just previous to that statement the court 
evidences the fact it has looked to legislative history when it stated in parL "Nor is it apparent 
from the legislative history that the lawmakers adopted the sponsor's reasoning along with the 
proposed language in the bill. ... Consequently, this is not part of the legislative history and sheds 
little light on the intent of the legislature." R. at 303-04 n.5. Again, that language precedes any 
interpretation of the statute by the cow1. 
The court then proceeds to set forth what it believes to he the relevant language of the 
statute and notes that "[bjy stripping the statute dovvn to the component parts to be construed it is 
fairly c<1sy to discern the intention of the legislature." R. at 306. From that language one can 
reasonable conclude that the court means the legislative intent can be readily discerned from the 
plain language of the statute. However, the court's next statement demonstrates that in fact that is 
not the case as it then goes straight to its conclusion that "the psychoactive substance in 
marijuana is [THC]" and the "synthetic substances" language is "referring to synthetic marijuana 
or synthetic substances that mimic the hallucinogenic properties of marijuana." R. at 307. The 
court could not have gotten to the "hallucinogenic prope1iies of marijuana" from the plain 
language and therefore the legislative intent must have been discerned from sources other than 
the statute. 
Next the court references the minutes of the legislative committees when it stated, "l tJhe 
minutes of the legislative committees also make clear that the purpose behind the legislation is 
the banning of categories of substances, not just particular compounds." R. at 308. But perhaps 
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most convincing is the court's recitation of a Statement of Purpose supplied the State which 
states: 
The purpose of the legislation is to create safe regulations for the public concerning 
[THC] fro111 synthetic drugs (Spice) that mimic the effects of Cannabis and identifying 
additional substances to be classified in Schedule I. 
R. at 307. 
The language referenced by the Court is not statutory and is part of the legislative history. 
Nevertheless, based on the language from the committee minutes and the Statement of Purpose 
the court concluded that "imitators of marijuana," or "synthetic substances that mimic the 
hallucinogenic properties of marijuana" vvcre covered the statute. Such a conclusion could not 
have been drawu from the plain language of the statute and came only after the court reviewed 
and recited aspects of legislative history in making its conclusion. 
There can be little doubt that the court did not apply the literal and plain language of the 
statute but rather afforded the statute an interpretation based on the perceived legislative intent 
outside or the statutory language. Of the most significant import was the court's reliance on its 
conclusions as to the alleged pharmacological effects of AM-2201 in concluding it was of the 
type intended to be criminalized by the legislature. It was error to do so and this Court should 
reverse the district court's decision. 
B. THE STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE BECAUSE IT LENDS 
ITSELF TO DIFFERING OPINIONS ON ITS MEANING AND LEAVES A PERSON OF 
ORDINARY INTELLIGENCE GUESSING AS TO WHAT CONDUCT IS ILLEGAL. 
The language as set fo11h in the 2011 version of LC. § 37-2705(d)(30) 1s 
unconstitutionally vague because it contains misleading language thereby creating confusion as 
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to ,hhat is criminal and what is not The confusion begins with the statute's phrase. "synthetic 
equivalents of the substances contained the plant [cannabis] ... and/or synthetic substances. 
derivatives. and their isomers with similar chemical structure such as ... " I.C. § 37-
2705(d)(30)(ernphasis added). The term "synthetic equivalent" leaves people guessing as to its 
meaning. ft was this term the court relied upon when turning to pharmacological effect despite 
language in the same paragraph stating "with similar chemical structure" and intentionally 
omitting pharmacological activity. See R. at 306-07. Consequently, one can view "synthetic 
equivalent" as meaning a substance that has a chemical structure that is similar to THC \Vhereas 
the court adopted the opinion that it is something that behaves like THC. The plain language of 
the statute fails to put people on notice that the pharmacological effects of the substance will 
determine whether it is a synthetic equivalent. 
The confusion continues with the legal fiction that the listed substances under the "such 
as" language in any way resembles the structure of THC. A side-by-side comparison of the 
substances such as JWH-018. JWH-019, JWH-122, and/or AM-2201 to THC show distinct and 
substantial differences in the chemical structure. See Ex. 1 0(a). 1 While AM-2201 may have only 
a single atom difference between it and JWH-018 both of those chemicals look nothing like 
Tl-IC. id. Nevertheless. the statute references THC and criminalizes synthetic equivalents of 
THC and "synthetic substances ... with similar chemical structure" to THC. LC.§ 37-2705(d)(30). 
1 The exhibits in the record contain a single exhibit that was not assigned an exhibit number but 
was placed between exhibit 10 and exhibit 11. The reason for the exhibit number omission is 
likely because the unnumbered exhibit was part of the motion to reconsider and not the original 
motion to dismiss. For ease of reference the Defendant will refer to that exhibit as 10a. 
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It is THC not JWII-018. to which Aivf-2201 is ultimately being compared. In providing 
the list of examples of substances that have a "similar chemical structure" with THC the statute 
describes whole groups oC compounds (vvhich v-iould admittedly include JWH-018) that in reality 
bear no resemblance to the chemical structure of THC. The result is a complete legal fiction 
wherein the legislature has deemed .IWH-018 to be structurally similar to THC despite the 
factual reality to the contrary. The result is that anyone reviewing a chemical not expressly 
described in the example list is left guessing as what is actually structurally similar to THC since 
the example list itself does not resemble TlIC. 
The confusion is compounded by the stunning degree of distinction in the example list 
bct\vecn structures that arc different in only the most minute ways. The example list sets forth 
compounds and then delineates the various forms of the compound that will still fall within the 
statute. l.C. ~ 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a). Of the ways delineated, the legislature provided that any 
"substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indolc ring by alkyl, alkenyl, cycloalkylmethyl, 
cycloalkylethyl..." would be included in the language of the statute. Id. The sole difference 
between an alkly and alkenyl is the presence of one or more double bonds between one or more 
carbon atoms. Tr. at 40:22-42:9. In other words, a single double bond anywhere on the 
substituent chain renders an alkenyl rather than an alkyl. Id. The same minute distinction is 
drawn out between cycloalkylmethyl and cycloalkylethyl which differ by an atom. Tr. at 43:2-
44:3. A person looking at the list must wonder why the legislature used language so specific and 
nuanced if it was not intended to provide some guidance as to which variances would be 
considered similar to THC and which ones would not. If describing the "parent compound" was 
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all that was necessary for an example list then the legislature only confused the matter by adding 
the alkyl language as it is assumed that language serves some runction in describing the types or 
substances that are illegal. It was this aspect above all others that so troubled the Defendant's 
experts vvho continually came back to that language as the defining features of the statute. It is 
tliis aspect that was resolved in 2012 when the legislature amended the language to remove the 
alkyl language and thereby remove some of the confusion. 
The above referenced aspects of the statute made the language vague in the present case. 
This is because in order for ;\M-2201 to be covered under the statute it would have to resemble 
the exnmple list which in turn. by operation of legal fiction. resembles THC. Such a process 
brings to mind a common logic formula ;\c-=B. B0""C. therefore A~°C. The problem arises where B 
does not equal C but may look similar to C. At that point the logic problem breaks down and so 
does the statute because of the legal fiction, and the fact that A does not factually equal B to 
begin with. 
When one looks at the AM-2201 in the present case it does not resemble THC. When one 
looks at the example language in the statute, AM-2201 does is excluded because it does not 
contain an "alkyl, alkenyl, cycloalkylmethyL cycloalkylethyl. or 2-(4-morpholinyl)ethyl." Tr. at 
39-40. 118-25. and 131. Rather it contains an alkyl halide, also known as a haloalkyl. Id. While 
only a single atom makes this distinction in the v,orld or chemistry a single atom can make a lot 
of difference. Besides. if single atoms do make a difference, why then did the legislature take 
pains to make distinctions between structures that are only an atom different? If the legislature 
demonstrates a single atom ditkrence is worth covering under the statute then a person of 
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ordinary intelligence is reasonable in concluding that a single atom rendering an alkyl to an alkyl 
halide removes it from the language of the statute. 
lndcccL both the Defendant and the State understood the issue rested in the determination 
of \Vhcther an alkyl halide W8S included in subsection (ii)(a) as the briefing and arguments 
focused on that issue. 1 l was the court not the parties, that turned from that language, and 
concluded that looking to that language "misses the point." See R. at 305. 
According the district court in the present case, that ordinary person vvould be wrong 
because looking to the language in subsection (ii)(a) "misses the point." R. at 305. Indeed, the 
Court ultimately declines to even determine whether AM-2201 is described in subsection (ii)(a) 
concluding instead that because AM-220 l behaves like THC it was therefore intended to be 
covered by the statute. Such is the very essence of vagueness. Under the district court's 
interpretation the language in subsection (ii)(a) serves more as a red herring than an example list 
because the question would ultimately be one of pharmacological effect and not structure. See R. 
at 306-08. 111 short the Defendant should have known that effect would be given to a non-
codified Statement of Purpose and no effect vvould be given to the language in the example list. 
It was this application of the legislative intent and disregard for the details of the example list 
that rendered the statute unconstitutionally vague. 
C. THE DEFENDANT'S APPEAL IS NOT MOOT AS THE MOTION WAS 
SPECIFIC AS TO AM-2201, THE SUBSTANCE OF AM-2201 WAS THE PRIMARY 
SUBSTANCE IDENTIFIED IN THE DEFENDANT'S OPERATION, AND IF IT WERE 
FOUND THAT AM-2201 WAS NOT ILLEGAL THE DEFENDANT WOULD HAVE 
MIST AKE OF FACT DEFENSES AT TRIAL. 
The State correctly notes that the Defendant was found in possession of three different 
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cherniculs. A:V1-220L JWH-019. and JWH-210. R. at 236-37. The samples were derived at 
different times c1nd from different sources (i.e. dumpster dives und controlled buys). R. at 134-
70. The Criminal Complaint filed by the State lumped all of the substances into a single count 
without distinguishing between the substances. R. at I 0-1 S and 32-36. 
The Defendant acknov,:!cdges that JWH-019 and JWH-210 would fall under the 
description or proscribed chemicals in J.C.§ 37-270S(d)(J0)(ii)(a) but lakes issue with the State's 
assertion that AM-2201 also falls under that statute. lt is as iC the State charged someone with 
possession of marijuana. cocaine. and sugar in the same count without breaking apart the 
substances. The resulting problem for the Defendant was attacking the charges as they related to 
AM-2201 where AM-2201 had been rolled up in the same count as JWH-019 and JWH-210. The 
Defendant approached it by filing a motion to dismiss as to the AM-2201 only. 
Even if the Defendant were successful in his motion, Count r would have not been 
dismissed in its entirety because of the remaining substances JWH-019 and JWH-210. 
Nevertheless. a dismissal as to allegations relating to AM-220 I would have opened up mistake 
of fact defenses to the Defendant. More specifically, if the court concluded AM-2201 was not a 
controlled substance the Defendant could have. and would have. claimed he never intended to 
possess either JWH-019 or JWH-2 l 0. nor did he know he was in possession of those chemicals 
as he believed he possessed only AM-2201. Due to the court's conclusion this defense was 
unavailable as the Defendant would essentially be saying he intended to have one controlled 
substance. not three. but a controlled substance nonetheless. 
The procedural quandry was caused by the method of charging and the Defendant had to 
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the motion vvitli something. It was understood by the State and the Court what the nature 
of the cha! lengc v,:as and its ultimate purpose. The Court stylized it as a motion to suppress in its 
decision memorandum. R. at 300. Whatever the proper name for the motion its purpose was clear 
to the parties invo]yed and the court and that purpose remains the same. A determination is 
needed on the chemical AM-220 l as that determination either opens or closes doors to other 
defenses for the Defendant. To that end it is not a moot issue. The Defendant's appeal was 
conditioned on that premise with the understanding that if AM-220 I is legal he can withdraw his 
guilty pica and pursue the remainder of the charges at trial. For that reason the appeal is still 
properly before this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court improperly turned to legislative intent and history. The court 
improperly looked to pharmacological effect and consequently rendered an incorrect 
interpretation of the statute. It was error to do so and the court's decision should be ove1iurned. 
The statute is unconstitutionally vague as it creates confusing legal fictions and focuses 
on minute structural di tJerences that are not considered by the court. The statute eliminated 
references to pharmacological activity and yet the alleged pharmacological effect was the driving 
factor in concluding AM-220 l was covered by the statute. Because the basis for the conclusion 
\Vas based on language not derived from the statute it must be unconstitutionally vague as 
applied. For the foregoing reasons and those set forth in the Defendant's Opening Brief the 
Defendant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision of the district court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of June, 2013. 
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